PR Isn't Enough

Advocates of proportional representation (PR) make a powerful case. They claim that our current electoral system, first-past-the-post (FPTP), is not democratic. They are right. More often than not a political party that gains less than half the popular vote wins the election. In 2015, for example the Liberals, with under 40 per cent of the popular vote won a majority government. Similarly, the Conservatives governed over the preceding decade without ever winning 40 per cent support. Our system grants 100 per cent of the power to parties most people oppose. We have an electoral system, but not a democratic system. A PR system would rectify that lingering flaw in our democracy.

But PR isn't enough. It would ensure we are fairly represented in our legislatures, but it would not ensure we are all included in the decision-making process, and that should be the true goal of democracy. Fair representation in governance would mean that ideally citizens are represented proportional to the popularity of their view. For example, if 75 per cent of the people supported view A and 25 per cent view B, then a piece of legislation would ideally consist of 75 per cent A and 25 per cent B. This, however, is generally impractical as issues do not tend to be neatly divisible. Nonetheless, all citizens should be equitably represented in the decision-making.

Even under PR, many citizens are not. Supporters of the party or parties who form the government are represented, but the supporters of other parties often are not, even though they are represented in the legislature. Unfortunately, legislatures are often more rubber stamps than governors. Governance is left for the most part in the hands of cabinet, i.e. the executive, a body chosen by the prime minister or premier. Other legislators, on both sides of the house, become spectators to the process, obediently casting their votes yea or nay as instructed by caucus.

How then do we involve all legislators in governance?

First, we can allow them to vote their consciences in their legislatures as opposed to demanding strict party discipline. Western democracies exhibit a wide range in their tolerance of legislators’ independence. In this country parliamentarians almost invariably defer to caucus and vote as party blocks while in the U.S. Congress, representatives and senators are allowed considerable leeway in their yeas and nays. The latter not only have greater opportunity to vote their consciences but also greater opportunity to represent the interests of their particular constituents.

Our representatives deserve the right to state their views openly and freely, to vote on them just as openly and freely, and we deserve the right to measure their performance as our, not their parties’, representatives. They should not become mere ciphers.

Elected members do owe a loyalty to their parties as it is largely through their parties that they get elected. And there is at least one caution in allowing freedom from party discipline and that regards the business of lobbying. Party discipline helps protect legislators from the undue influence of powerful lobby groups. Lobbying requires stringent rules at any time, but especially when representatives are unleashed from party discipline. The influence of lobbies can be significantly reduced by banning political contributions from corporations and limiting those from individuals.

Providing greater power to committees would also enhance the influence of representatives. They could even initiate legislation rather than the executive branches of government. Committees can bring a personal touch legislatures lack; the individual legislator can assume a greater importance; committees can be less partisan, less strident; and committees can be more efficient than the often cumbersome legislatures.

Legislatures use committees now: standing committees on everything from Human Resources to Finance to National Defence; legislative committees appointed to review bills; and special committees set up to investigate particular issues. They do a great deal of important work. Ultimately, however, they are subject to the whims of the executive, which is inclined to ignore any committee recommendations it frowns upon. This ultimate impotence need not be the case. Not all legislatures are little more than debating clubs—representatives in the U.S. Congress are quite capable of making law.

Giving committees teeth would require transferring law-making power to them. Standing committees could be responsible for initiating legislation in their areas, special committees for issues that arise outside of the regular jurisdictions. Committees could bring other appropriate government business under the rule of the legislature as well.

Parties would be allocated committee membership proportionate to their share of seats in the legislature. Committees could then choose their own chairpersons, the choices to be approved by the entire legislature. The chairpersons of the committees would become the cabinet. Currently, the prime minister, who is chosen not by all the people but by his party, selects the cabinet, which in effect becomes the government. Currently, cabinet ministers are chosen from the legislature, but they have no more of a mandate from the people for their portfolios than does the prime minister. If cabinet ministers are to be responsible to the legislature, to the representatives of the people, they must be chosen by the legislators.

Strong legislative committees, combined with free votes, would give legislators the power they deserve as the people’s representatives.

Legislative committees as law-making bodies would allow all parties in the legislature to participate in governance and therefore allow all citizens to be represented in governance. All legislators would make law. By holding open hearings and accepting written submissions on proposed bills, committees could incorporate the views of a cross-section of individual citizens and interest groups. Bringing more views into the process would result in better legislation, reduce friction, facilitate the acceptance of legislation, and create a climate more amenable to new ideas.

By bringing all the political parties together, as well as other social groups, the process of creating our laws, and indeed governing ourselves, would become a much more co-operative, less adversarial, process. The very concept of official opposition, loyal or otherwise, would be diluted, and the hostile, macho, obstructionist behaviour it instigates subdued.